makes a case that the US has twisted Taiwan for decades on fighter procurements to supplement by cost sharing our own weapons, but I think the history is really more complex. Sharing the cost on the F-35 may not make that pig a success.
Taiwan Ambiguity and Confusion - an unrecognized country
Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China
(ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in
1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949, ceding the mainland to the communists, and taking possession of the island from the defeated Japanese. The United
States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a
non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979 after initiation of relations by
the Nixon administration.
The State Department claims an “unofficial” U.S.
relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales.
The 34 year old Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a
diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide
policy are the three Carter – Reagan communiques U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of
1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the Reagan Administration “Six Assurances” of 1982.
(See also CRS Report
RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements
from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.) A legalistic analysis has been made to show that Taiwan is actually a US territory.
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For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2012, Taiwan was the 11th -largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.- PRC cooperation. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is in reality an important autonomous actor.
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For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2012, Taiwan was the 11th -largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention), the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and U.S.- PRC cooperation. While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is in reality an important autonomous actor.
A democracy resigned to follow the path of Hong Kong?
Today, 23 countries (including the Vatican) have diplomatic
relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan’s 23 million people enjoy
self-governance with democratic elections. The population of Taiwan has
alternated between support of independence by the DPP and integration with the
mainland under the KMT. After Taiwan’s presidential election in 2008, the
United States congratulated Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy.” Democracy has
offered Taiwan’s people a greater say in their status, given competing politics
about Taiwan’s national identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and
legislative elections in January 2012. Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou
won re-election against the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate.
Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official
dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some
have stressed the need to take steps by the United States and by Taiwan to
strengthen their relationship to advance U.S. interests. Another approach has
viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U.S. attention to shift to
expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U.S. arms sales and other
dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts
into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have
pursued a positive, parallel U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has sought
U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.S. Visa
Waiver Program (VWP) (in 2012), the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and talks on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas.
The United States has concerns that Taiwan under President
Ma has not given sufficient priority to defense and cut the defense budget in
2009, 2010, and 2011 until an increase in 2012. The 2013 budget ($10.5 billion)
is a small drop from that in 2012. Ma’s Administration proposed a 2014 defense
budget at the same level as the 2013 budget and would make up 2.0% of GDP. Ma
has failed to reach the promised defense spending at 3% of GDP, even as
Taiwan’s military shifts from conscripts to volunteer personnel.
There are increasing concerns about whether Taiwan’s military is hollowing out, partly due to problems in recruitment and retention while shifting to a volunteer force by 2015 without sufficient resources and commitment by the leadership. On July 20, 2013, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators protested at the MND, after the death of a corporal on July 4 reportedly from heatstroke and abuse while in detention. The incident triggered another demonstration on August 3 by an estimated 100,000-250,000 protestors against the government’s handling of this and other cases. Even before the protests that could harm recruitment and retention, MND reached only 14% of its recruitment goal for the first half of the year. The next month, the government delayed full conversion to a volunteer force for two years, or by 2017.
There are increasing concerns about whether Taiwan’s military is hollowing out, partly due to problems in recruitment and retention while shifting to a volunteer force by 2015 without sufficient resources and commitment by the leadership. On July 20, 2013, an estimated 30,000 demonstrators protested at the MND, after the death of a corporal on July 4 reportedly from heatstroke and abuse while in detention. The incident triggered another demonstration on August 3 by an estimated 100,000-250,000 protestors against the government’s handling of this and other cases. Even before the protests that could harm recruitment and retention, MND reached only 14% of its recruitment goal for the first half of the year. The next month, the government delayed full conversion to a volunteer force for two years, or by 2017.
Budget
pressures forced Taiwan to cut one-third of the original $3.5 billion
Po Sheng plan to integrate its C4I structure between air, navy and ground units. As it stands, only 60 of Taiwan’s 146 F-16A/Bs have
Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution SystemLow Volume
Terminals and none of the Mirage fighters have them, thanks to an
“inability to obtain French cooperation in the integration effort,” said
Fu Mei, director of the Taiwan Security Analysis Center.
The Navy has installed the Link-16 terminals on two of its eight
PFG-2 Perry-class frigates and three of six La Fayette-class frigates.
The United States has long been concerned that someday Taiwan
may give up its military secrets to the PRC even though Taiwan has taken more
aggressive methods to protect itself from penetration since last year.
Yang Nien-chu, Taiwan's deputy defense minister, said that Beijing had
never given up its attempts to steal crucial information even though
cross-strait ties have improved since 2008. "Nothing has really changed,
Beijing has continued its espionage activities despite the improvement
in ties," said Yang.
Balance of Power shifts to PRC - US to ROC you can have what you don't want.
The Defense
Department has reported to Congress in annual reports on the PLA that the
balance of forces across the Taiwan Strait has continued to shift to the PRC’s
favor. Moreover, the Secretary’s report of March 2009 told Congress that it was
no longer the case that Taiwan’s Air Force enjoyed dominance of the airspace
over the strait. Since 2001, Taiwan has discussed the acquisition of
diesel-electric submarines. Since 2006, Taiwan has been unsuccessful in trying
to submit a formal request to procure new F-16C/D fighters. One policy issue
concerns whether President Obama denied or delayed arms sales out of concern
about military exchanges and other aspects of the overall relationship with the
PRC. The Administration maintains that it adheres to the TRA. While the PRC has
not warned Taiwan of consequences in continuing to seek U.S. weapons, the PRC
has claimed to “suspend” many military meetings with the United States.
President Obama notified Congress on January 29, 2010, of major arms sales to
Taiwan: five programs with a total value of $6.4 billion. Again submitting
notifications on one day, President Obama proposed on September 21, 2011, three
major arms sales programs with a total value of $5.9 billion, including
upgrades for Taiwan’s existing F-16A/B fighters. Like Bush, President Obama has
not notified Congress of the submarine design program (the only one pending
from decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan’s formal request for new
F-16C/D fighters.
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues - R41952.pdf
CRS Report Reviews Taiwan Security, U.S. Relations | Defense News | defensenews.com
U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues - R41952.pdf
CRS Report Reviews Taiwan Security, U.S. Relations | Defense News | defensenews.com
F-20, F-16, and JSF F-35
Shift from Clinton to Reagan doomed F-20 Tigershark
The Northrop F-20 Tigershark (initially F-5G)
was a privately financed light fighter, designed and built by Northrop. Its development began in 1975 as a
further evolution of Northrop's F-5E
Tiger II, featuring a new engine that greatly improved overall performance,
and a modern avionics suite including a powerful and flexible radar. Compared with
the F-5E, the F-20 was much faster, gained beyond-visual-range air-to-air
capability, and had a full suite of air-to-ground modes capable of firing most
U.S. weapons. With these improved capabilities, the F-20 became competitive
with contemporary fighter designs such as the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting
Falcon, but was much less expensive to purchase and operate.
Much of the F-20's development was carried out under a U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) project called "FX". FX sought to develop fighters that would
be capable in combat with the latest Soviet
aircraft but, by excluding sensitive front-line technologies used by the United States Air Force, the FX could be
safely sold to foreign nations without the risk of significant technological
advancements falling into Soviet hands. FX was a product of the Carter
administration's military export policies.
The signing of the 1982 US-PRC
Joint Communiqué was a major agreement on arms sales, which continued
blocking sales of the F-5G to Taiwan. By this point the Taiwanese had started
their own light-fighter project, the AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-kuo. In signing the
Communiqué, the U.S. was signaling that Taiwan would not receive modern
aircraft, therefore the Ching-kuo became Taiwan's primary focus. As a result,
the F-5G's sales potential remained unestablished. Following an agreement to
sell F-16s to Pakistan, Northrop felt that the F-5G needed to match the
performance of F-16's; implementing both avionics and engine upgrades. Northrop
requested the designation "F-20"; the USAF approved in late 1982, and
of the name Tigershark in March 1983. Northrop had high hopes for the
F-20 in the international market; however, the F-20 had to compete for sales
against aircraft like the F-16, the USAF's latest fighter design. The
development program was eventually abandoned in 1986 after three prototypes had
been built and a fourth partially completed.
F-16 Fighting Falcon
The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program: Its Progress and Concerns PSAD-79-63, Jun 25, 1979
The US lost on the F-16 multi-national procurement due to Euro co-production and the Euros didn't like playing by US procurement rules.
The multinational F-16 aircraft program required the United States to
place contracts totalling about $1.6 billion (January 1975 dollars)
with producers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The
coproduction requirement created numerous management challenges. At
least two European coproducers profited in converting their
currency to U.S. dollars, and others are suspected of doing the same.
This was a violation of an agreement between the United States and the
European participating governments (EPG). Due to the
dollar's decline, the United States was subject to increased
costs under the F-16 program. European government and industry officials
pointed out serious difficulty in complying with U.S. procurement
regulations and cost accounting standards. They wanted relief
from certain U.S. requirements before they participate in future
coproduction arrangements.
Joint Strike Fighter F-35 Lightning II -
x
All things to all men, but not good at anything?
F-16 Fighting Falcon
The Multinational F-16 Aircraft Program: Its Progress and Concerns PSAD-79-63, Jun 25, 1979
The US lost on the F-16 multi-national procurement due to Euro co-production and the Euros didn't like playing by US procurement rules.
The multinational F-16 aircraft program required the United States to place contracts totalling about $1.6 billion (January 1975 dollars) with producers in Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The coproduction requirement created numerous management challenges. At least two European coproducers profited in converting their currency to U.S. dollars, and others are suspected of doing the same. This was a violation of an agreement between the United States and the European participating governments (EPG). Due to the dollar's decline, the United States was subject to increased costs under the F-16 program. European government and industry officials pointed out serious difficulty in complying with U.S. procurement regulations and cost accounting standards. They wanted relief from certain U.S. requirements before they participate in future coproduction arrangements.
Joint Strike Fighter F-35 Lightning II -
x
All things to all men, but not good at anything?
x
The $300+ billion, multi-national F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program
is the largest single military program in history. It’s also reaching a
critical nexus. In order to keep costs under control and justify the
industrial ramp up underway, participating countries need to sign order
agreements soon. The problem is that the F-35 is not a proven fighter
design, with a demonstrated baseline of performance in service. It’s a
developmental aircraft in the early middle of its test program, which is
now scheduled to continue until 2018 or even 2019.
As one might expect, this status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. Costs aren’t certain, numbers ordered are slipping in many countries, and timelines aren’t certain after numerous schedule delays. With combat testing still a year or 2 away, even operational performance isn’t certain. That’s especially consequential for air forces that expect to field the F-35 as their only fighter.
"Air Combat Past, Present and Future," John Stillion, Scott Perdue, August 2008
2008 RAND Pacific Vision Study
NPR - The F-35's History Of Costly Problems
The Joint Strike Fighter is the largest and most expensive weapons program in history. It is supposed to be a "cheap" replacement for a number of fighters flown by every U.S. military service, but it's years behind schedule and billions over budget. Host Rachel Martin talks with Adam Ciralsky, who wrote an article in Vanity Fair about the troubled history of the F-35.
As one might expect, this status makes the F-35 a controversial long-term bet in many of the program’s member countries. Costs aren’t certain, numbers ordered are slipping in many countries, and timelines aren’t certain after numerous schedule delays. With combat testing still a year or 2 away, even operational performance isn’t certain. That’s especially consequential for air forces that expect to field the F-35 as their only fighter.
"Air Combat Past, Present and Future," John Stillion, Scott Perdue, August 2008
2008 RAND Pacific Vision Study
If you think of the most high-profile federal procurement debacles in
recent memory, two things come to mind: the wildly over-budget F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and now HealthCare.gov.
It's not news that the Pentagon's fated F-35 program is riddled with dilemmas.
For more than a decade, it's bumped into roadblock after roadblock.
When the planes aren't grounded, they're forbidden to fly in bad
weather, combat missions or at night. Vanity Fair just published a lengthy look at just how bad a mess it is. NPR - The F-35's History Of Costly Problems
The Joint Strike Fighter is the largest and most expensive weapons program in history. It is supposed to be a "cheap" replacement for a number of fighters flown by every U.S. military service, but it's years behind schedule and billions over budget. Host Rachel Martin talks with Adam Ciralsky, who wrote an article in Vanity Fair about the troubled history of the F-35.
The Joint Strike Fighter is the most expensive weapons system ever
developed. It is plagued by design flaws and cost overruns. It flies
only in good weather. The computers that run it lack the software they
need for combat. No one can say for certain when the plane will work as
advertised. Until recently, the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, was
operating with a free hand—paid handsomely for its own mistakes. Looking
back, even the general now in charge of the program can’t believe how
we got to this point. In sum: all systems go!
Lies, Damn Lies, and the Trillion-Dollar F-35
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Has Improved the Program, but Affordability Challenges and Other Risks Remain GAO-13-690T, Jun 19, 2013
x
http://www.youtube.com/user/PowerRossiya
Then Truth Revealed by the United States Department of Defense, the United States Air Force (USAF), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the US RAND Corporation Research ANd Development, US and Australia Pacific Vision data.
The exercise PACAFs Pacific Vision on sept 25/08 revealed the United States air superiority is just a fantasy. The exercise was consisted of face the Red Team one hundred Su-27SM, four Su-30 and two Su-35 against Blue Team one hundred F-35, one hundred eighty seven F-22 and four hundred F/A-18E/F. The exercise showed the blue team higher in number of aircraft is double inferior when hundreds of Blue Forces aircraft were lost in the first 20 minutes downed by the Red Forces., on the other hand only 12 aircraft was downed in the Red Team.
Pacific Vision effect the production of the F-22 was canceled and the F-35 project not longer receives investment all since 2008 by Barack Hussein Obama II and Robert Michael Gates.
Watch why F-22 is canceled in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL5jAx...
Watch Russian 5th gen stealth fighter Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJRZBJ...
Watch Chinese 5th gen stealth fighter Chengdu J-20 in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slLtpO...
Watch After the cancellation of the F-22 the few remaining units still cause frustration in the USAF in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICnR09...
Then Truth Revealed by the United States Department of Defense, the United States Air Force (USAF), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the US RAND Corporation Research ANd Development, US and Australia Pacific Vision data.
The exercise PACAFs Pacific Vision on sept 25/08 revealed the United States air superiority is just a fantasy. The exercise was consisted of face the Red Team one hundred Su-27SM, four Su-30 and two Su-35 against Blue Team one hundred F-35, one hundred eighty seven F-22 and four hundred F/A-18E/F. The exercise showed the blue team higher in number of aircraft is double inferior when hundreds of Blue Forces aircraft were lost in the first 20 minutes downed by the Red Forces., on the other hand only 12 aircraft was downed in the Red Team.
Pacific Vision effect the production of the F-22 was canceled and the F-35 project not longer receives investment all since 2008 by Barack Hussein Obama II and Robert Michael Gates.
Watch why F-22 is canceled in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bL5jAx...
Watch Russian 5th gen stealth fighter Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJRZBJ...
Watch Chinese 5th gen stealth fighter Chengdu J-20 in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slLtpO...
Watch After the cancellation of the F-22 the few remaining units still cause frustration in the USAF in the next link - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICnR09...
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