NASA Challenger Disaster - management failure?

How an Organizational Breakdown at NASA Let the Challenger Lift Off

In a new 20-minute documentary produced by Retro Report and The New York Times, the managers and engineers who were involved in the decision to send Challenger up that January day describe what went wrong. The engineers at Morton-Thiokol, the makers of the O-rings that failed during launch, had recommended against launch because of the unusually cold temperatures that day. But NASA's managers reversed the engineers' recommendation—and the Challenger lifted off.

It will be interesting to see if it adds anything new.

Space Shuttle Challenger disaster - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when Space Shuttle Challenger (mission STS-51-L) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members. The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida at 11:38 EST (16:38 UTC). Disintegration of the vehicle began after an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The O-ring failure caused a breach in the SRB joint it sealed, allowing pressurized hot gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB's aft attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter.

Challenger Disaster - Facts & Summary - HISTORY.com

On January 28, 1986, the American shuttle orbiter Challenger broke up 73 seconds after liftoff, bringing a devastating end to the spacecraft’s 10th mission. The disaster claimed the lives of all seven astronauts aboard, including Christa McAuliffe, a teacher from New Hampshire who had been selected to join the mission and teach lessons from space to schoolchildren around the country. It was later determined that two rubber O-rings, which had been designed to separate the sections of the rocket booster, had failed due to cold temperatures on the morning of the launch. The tragedy and its aftermath received extensive media coverage and prompted NASA to temporarily suspend all shuttle missions.

7 myths about the Challenger shuttle disaster - Technology & science - Space | NBC News

here's the way the mission may be remembered:

1. Few people actually saw the Challenger tragedy unfold live on television.
2. The shuttle did not explode in the common definition of that word.
3. The flight, and the astronauts’ lives, did not end at that point, 73 seconds after launch.
4. The design of the booster, while possessing flaws subject to improvement, was neither especially dangerous if operated properly, nor the result of political interference.
5. Replacement of the original asbestos-bearing putty in the booster seals was unrelated to the failure.
6. There were pressures on the flight schedule, but none of any recognizable political origin.
7. Claims that the disaster was the unavoidable price to be paid for pioneering a new frontier were self-serving rationalizations on the part of those responsible for incompetent engineering management — the disaster should have been avoidable.

The Rogers Commission Report - Nasa

Spaceline: The Challenger Legacy

Richard Feynman and the Space Shuttle Challenger investigation
Feynman's appendix to The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident in which he dissents with the majority opinion of the commission.

The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster > ENGINEERING.com

Key Issues
How does the implied social contract of profressionals apply to this case?
What professional responsibilities were neglected, if any?
Should NASA have done anything differently in their launch decision procedure? 

Inspector Feynman: 'Challenger Disaster' stars scientist-sleuth - NBC News.com

Challenger 20 Years Later - The Rest Of The Story

The commission concluded that "No one person was to blame." Roger [Boisjoly] insisted his comments be added to the official report. Feynman blamed the disaster on "engineers and managers who were not communicating effectively."

 

Feynman died two years later from his fight with cancer, and no one at NASA was ever held accountable.

 

Roger leaves Thiokol just a few months after the hearings, and never returns. His testimony had damaged his relationship with his managers. He stated in the television special, "I still can't understand it because I did everything right." Roger just didn't understand how the game is played with NASA. This author did, and that's why I left the DoD industry. No movie or television special has ever told the real truth of what it's like to deal with the government or NASA.

 

Now Roger knows, too.

As reported in the recent book, It was Sally Ride, who recently also died of pancreatic cancer, who was the guide behind Feynman, and who acquired and leaked damning documentation on the O rings.

Many books have been written on this topic. Following are a few I found useful:
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