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| China’s Yuan-class Submarine |
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| Chinese Active Defense Layers (Office of Naval Intelligence graphic). Note that the range lines reflect where PLA aircraft and submarines might be expected to operate in wartime based on evidence to date. While PLA aircraft would be unlikely to fly further east from the second layer's line if U.S. and allied air coverage from bases along the Second Island Chain was strong, the same might not be true for PLAN SSNs. Also note that the maritime approaches to Luzon and the northern/central Ryukyus fall within the PLA's middle layer, and Taiwan and the southern Ryukyus within the inner layer. |
This brief focuses on one area in which China has made rapid and substantial relative improvements: its ability to locate and attack U.S. surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, in conflicts centered on Taiwan or the Spratly Islands.
During the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, China was reportedly unable to locate, much less attack, two U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups in the waters around Taiwan. In contrast, China can now hold the U.S. Navy's surface fleet at risk at significant ranges from the mainland. This threat to the U.S. surface fleet continues to grow. China's anti-surface capability is founded on four developments:
While the development of China's anti-ship ballistic missile capability has garnered headlines, this analysis suggests that the PLA's steady (but less heralded) development of quieter, more capable
submarines represents a more immediate threat — one that puts U.S. carrier-strike groups within 2,000 km of the Chinese coast at significant risk. In 1996, China had taken delivery of only two
submarines that could be described, by any reasonable definition, as modern. The remainder of its fleet consisted of legacy boats based on 1950s technology, lacking teardrop shaped hulls and armed only with torpedoes.
By 2017, China will have a smaller but more capable fleet, with 49 modern ships, including both Russian Kilo-class boats and indigenous designs. China's recent submarine classes are armed with both sophisticated cruise missiles and torpedoes, greatly increasing the range from which they can attack. Although most Chinese boats are diesel-powered and none is up to U.S. standards, they could nevertheless threaten U.S. surface ships.
During the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, China was reportedly unable to locate, much less attack, two U.S. aircraft-carrier battle groups in the waters around Taiwan. In contrast, China can now hold the U.S. Navy's surface fleet at risk at significant ranges from the mainland. This threat to the U.S. surface fleet continues to grow. China's anti-surface capability is founded on four developments:
- the establishment of an increasingly capable long-range maritime surveillance capability designed to detect and track surface ships,
- the deployment of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles and the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile,
- the acquisition of strike aircraft with greater range and power, and
- the deployment of new classes of larger and quieter submarines armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes.
While the development of China's anti-ship ballistic missile capability has garnered headlines, this analysis suggests that the PLA's steady (but less heralded) development of quieter, more capable
submarines represents a more immediate threat — one that puts U.S. carrier-strike groups within 2,000 km of the Chinese coast at significant risk. In 1996, China had taken delivery of only two
submarines that could be described, by any reasonable definition, as modern. The remainder of its fleet consisted of legacy boats based on 1950s technology, lacking teardrop shaped hulls and armed only with torpedoes.
Related/Background:
- Essay: China's Submarine Solution for the Taiwan Strait - USNI News
- Essay: Inside the Design of China’s Yuan-class Submarine - USNI News
- How Did China Just Win Thailand’s New Submarine Bid? | The Diplomat
- China’s Yuan-class Submarine Visits Karachi: An Assessment
- Next Big Future: USA, Russia and China Submarine Lower Detectability Race
- Information Dissemination: Potential Chinese Anti-Ship Capabilities Between the First and Second Island Chains
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