Abstract
Less than a decade ago, China's air force was an antiquated service equipped almost exclusively with weapons based on 1950s-era Soviet designs and operated by personnel with questionable training according to outdated employment concepts. Today, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) appears to be on its way to becoming a modern, highly capable air force for the 21st century. This monograph analyzes publications of the Chinese military, previously published Westernanalyses of China's air force, and information available in published sources about current and future capabilities of the PLAAF. It describes the concepts for employing forces that the PLAAF is likely to implement in the future, analyzes how those concepts might be realized in a conflict over Taiwan, assesses the implications of China implementing these concepts, and provides recommendations about actions that should be taken in response.
Implications and Recommendations
By 2015 or so, the weapon systems and platforms China is
acquiring will potentially enable it to effectively implement the four types of
air force campaigns described in the previous section. The significant numbers
of modern fighter aircraft and SAMs, as well as the long range early warning
radars and secure data and voice communication links China is likely to have by
2015, for example, coupled with the hardening and camouflage measures China has
already taken, would make a Chinese air defense campaign, if conducted
according to the principles described in Chinese military publications, highly
challenging for U.S. air forces. Similarly, those same modern fighters, along with
ground-launched conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, cruise missile–carrying
medium bombers, and aerial refueling aircraft, will enable China to conduct
offensive operations far into the western Pacific. Whether China will actually
be able to fully exploit its air force doctrine and capabilities, however, is
less clear. Much will depend on the quality of the training and leadership of
China’s air force, and it should be pointed out that the PLAAF last engaged in
major combat operations in the Jinmen campaign of 1958, more than 50 years ago (see
pp. 187–223).
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